Loading...

Media is loading
 

Date

4-28-2020

Description

While Wittgenstein,'enculturation view of language learning is more complete than Quine,'empirical inductivist approach, it is unable to guide a viable pedagogy of second-language acquisition without components of Quine,'understanding at its side. Quine,'most significant failing is his lack of distinction between the process of acquiring our first language and the process of learning other languages after that. Wittgenstein aptly points out that babies'lack of understanding as to ,òwhat a language is'prevents them from accessing the referential structure needed to learn language via inductive hypothesis formation, as prescribed by Quine. Yet, Wittgenstein,'total reliance on sociality as a teaching mechanism fails to take advantage of second-language learners'diversified processing capabilities, making acquisition unnecessarily burdensome and slow. Wittgenstein,'account is essential because it holds the desire to understand and to be understood as fundamental to the process of language learning. Quine,'observationist approach reaffirms the importance of language,'technical qualities (pronunciation, syntax, modulation) which are validated by Wittgenstein only insofar as they enhance clarity of communication, and are not considered valuable in and of themselves. Considering both, I outline a language pedagogy prioritizing efficiency of learning, depth of communicative potential and technique of production.

Share

COinS
 
Apr 28th, 12:00 AM

Pedagogy of Secondary and Tertiary Languages: The Path Wittgenstein Cannot Walk Alone

While Wittgenstein,'enculturation view of language learning is more complete than Quine,'empirical inductivist approach, it is unable to guide a viable pedagogy of second-language acquisition without components of Quine,'understanding at its side. Quine,'most significant failing is his lack of distinction between the process of acquiring our first language and the process of learning other languages after that. Wittgenstein aptly points out that babies'lack of understanding as to ,òwhat a language is'prevents them from accessing the referential structure needed to learn language via inductive hypothesis formation, as prescribed by Quine. Yet, Wittgenstein,'total reliance on sociality as a teaching mechanism fails to take advantage of second-language learners'diversified processing capabilities, making acquisition unnecessarily burdensome and slow. Wittgenstein,'account is essential because it holds the desire to understand and to be understood as fundamental to the process of language learning. Quine,'observationist approach reaffirms the importance of language,'technical qualities (pronunciation, syntax, modulation) which are validated by Wittgenstein only insofar as they enhance clarity of communication, and are not considered valuable in and of themselves. Considering both, I outline a language pedagogy prioritizing efficiency of learning, depth of communicative potential and technique of production.